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Abstract
I argue that not all context dependent expressions are alike. Pure (or ordinary)
indexicals behave more or less as Kaplan thought. But quasi indexicals behave in
someways like indexicals and in other ways not like indexicals. A quasi indexical
sentence ϕ allows for cases in which one party utters ϕ and the other its negation,
and neither party’s claim has to be false. In this sense, quasi indexicals are like
pure indexicals (think: “I am a doctor”/“I amnot a doctor” as uttered by dierent
individuals). In such cases involving a pure indexical sentence, it is not appro-
priate for the two parties to reject each other’s claims by saying, “No.” However,
in such cases involving a quasi indexical sentence, it is appropriate for the par-
ties to reject each other’s claims. In this sense, quasi indexicals are not like pure
indexicals. Drawing on experimental evidence, I argue that gradable adjectives
like “rich” are quasi indexicals in this sense. e existence of quasi indexicals
raises trouble for many existing theories of context dependence, including stan-
dard contextualist and relativist theories. I propose an alternative semantic and
pragmatic theory of quasi indexicals, negotiated contextualism, that combines
insights from Kaplan 1989 and Lewis 1979. On my theory, rejection is licensed
with quasi indexicals (even when neither of the claims involved has to be false)
because the two utterances involve conicting proposals about how to update
the conversational score. I also adduce evidence that conicting truth value as-
sessments of a single quasi indexical utterance exhibit the same behavior. I argue
that negotiated contextualism can account for this puzzling property of quasi in-
dexicals as well.
ere is a trend in philosophy to think that all context dependence should be mod-
eled in the same way, along the lines of Kaplan 1989’s theory of indexicals. I think
this is a mistake—not all context dependent expressions behave the same way. e
contents of some context dependent expressions are settled directly by features of the
objective context (perhaps via a combination of speaker intentions, salience, and so
on). Kaplan was right about these expressions, so I’ll follow him and call them index-
icals (construed broadly to include demonstratives). However, there is another kind
of context dependent expression, whose content is open to negotiation in a context. I
call such expressions quasi indexicals.
Quasi indexicals
Indexicals have dierent contents in dierent contexts, and for this reason an in-
dexical sentence and its negation may express compatible claims if they are uttered in
dierent contexts (an indexical sentence is one that contains an unembedded occur-
rence of an indexical expression). In other words, someone can make a claim using
an indexical sentence ϕ and another person make a claim using its negation ¬ϕ and
it need not be the case that either claim is false. To illustrate, suppose that Lucy is in
Washington State talking to Wally in Arizona by phone:
(1) a. Lucy: It is raining here.
b. Wally: It is not raining here.
In this case, there is a strong intuition that it need not be the case that one of Lucy or
Wally’s claims is false. Say that a pair of claims is truth incompatible i it must be
the case that one of the claims is false.en, the observation is that Lucy and Wally’s
claims are not truth incompatible (below, I will drop the word “truth” and simply talk
about claims being incompatible or not in this technical sense).
Next, notice that ifWally were to try to reject Lucy’s claim, doing so would be odd:
(2) a. Lucy (in Washington): It is raining here.
b. Wally (in Arizona): #No, it is not raining here.
Wally’s rejection here is not sensible: it would lead one to think that either he did not
correctly hear Lucy, or does not understand English.
What happenswhenwe change the sentences uttered to involve only non-indexicals?
Compare (2) with the following:
(3) a. Gordon:omas Jeerson was a doctor.
b. Diane: No,omas Jeerson was not a doctor.
Unlikewith (2), in (3), it seems to us thatGordon andDiane’s claims are incompatible—
that is, at least one ofGordonorDiane’s claimsmust be false. And furthermore, Diane’s
rejection of Gordon’s claim here is perfectly sensible.
A natural generalization connects these two observations: the reason Diane’s re-
jection is sensible but Wally’s rejection is not is that Diane and Gordon’s claims are
incompatible, while Wally and Lucy’s claims are not incompatible. Say that a rejec-
tion discourse is one in which someone makes a claim by uttering a sentence ϕ, and
someone rejects that claim by uttering ⌜No, ¬ϕ⌝. It is then tempting to infer that a
sensible rejection discourse requires that the two claims are incompatible:1
1Notice that the claim here is restricted to exclude many cases of implicature denial, such as (cf.
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Rejection-Incompatibility Link
In any sensible rejection discourse, the two claims are incompatible.
As before, understand incompatible here in the technical sense of truth-incompatible as
dened above: thus, the Rejection-Incompatibility Link states that in any sensible
rejection discourse, it must be that at least one of the claims is false.2 One may then
draw on this principle to reason as follows. Given the Rejection-Incompatibility
Link, evidence that a sentence ψ only seems to give rise to sensible rejection dis-
courses is evidence that ψ does not allow for the possibility that an utterance of ψ in
one context and an utterance of ¬ψ in another context yield non-incompatible claims.
But an indexical sentence ϕ should allow for the possibility that an utterance of ϕ in
one context and an utterance of ¬ϕ in another context yield non-incompatible claims.
erefore, evidence that ψ only seems to give rise to sensible rejection discourses is
evidence that ψ is not an indexical sentence. is kind of reasoning has been used
Horn 1985, 1989, Sundell 2011):
(i) A: John ate some of the cookies.
B: No, John ate all of the cookies.
In this dialogue, since B does not utter the negation of the sentence A utters, A and B’s utterances do
not comprise a rejection discourse in our technical sense; so cases like this fall outside of the scope of
The Rejection-Incompatibility Link. However, one further problem remains, which stems from
cases of echoic metalinguistic negation:
(ii) A: John called the POlice.
B: No, John called the poLICE.
Here, A and B’s discourse is arguably a rejection discourse in our technical sense, and B’s rejection is
sensible even though A and B’s claims are arguably not incompatible—so this kind of case seems like
a counterexample to the Rejection-Incompatibility Link. To avoid the threat to our generalization
from echoic metalinguistic negation, I will stipulate that such echoic negations are to be excluded from
rejection discourses. I think we can safely identify and set aside such cases as orthogonal to the issue
at hand. Furthermore, note that my attempt to exclude these cases from consideration is helping the
Rejection-Incompatibility Link, which I am going to argue is false even given such favorable ex-
clusions. So, my excluding these kinds of cases is dialectically strengthening the position I intend to
criticize, not helping my own position.
2What I have in mind by “sensibility” here is that we can make sense of why the person rejected the
claim, in light of what we know about her beliefs and desires. Of course, there will be cases in which
Gordon says, “omas Jeersonwas a doctor,” andDiane says, “No,omas Jeersonwas not a doctor,”
in which we judge that it didn’t make sense that Diane rejected Gordon’s claim because (for instance)
he bet his life savings he would never reject any claim of Gordon’s aboutomas Jeerson. I think we
can safely set aside those cases as irrelevant to the diagnostic we are putting the rejection test to use for.
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extensively in philosophy of language to argue that various philosophically important
expressions are not context-dependent.3 However, recently, this reasoning has come
under scrutiny. In particular, the experimental work of Khoo 2015, Khoo & Knobe
2016 reveals a new contour to the debate: epistemic modal operators (“might”) and
moral predicates (“wrong”) in fact behave in ways directly opposed to the Rejection-
Incompatibility Link.ese papers discuss evidence fromordinary English speaker
intuitions suggesting that these expressions allow for sensible non-incompatible rejec-
tion discourses.4
e behavior of “might” and “wrong” suggests the possibility of a linguistic kind:
an expression which is like an indexical in allowing for non-incompatible utterance
pairs but like a non-indexical in always giving rise to sensible rejection discourses.
I call such expressions quasi indexicals. e crucial identifying property of a quasi
indexical is that it gives rise to sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses.
e rest of the paper is structured as follows. In §1, I argue that gradable adjec-
tives like “rich” give rise to sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses. I then turn
to discuss the upshot of this observation for various semantic/pragmatic theories, ar-
guing that many existing semantic/pragmatic theories of gradable adjectives struggle
to predict this property of “rich” (§2). e key question we are le with is this: in
sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses, what are the two parties disagreeing
about? In §3, I sketch a theory of quasi indexicals (focusing again on “rich”) that I
call negotiated contextualism, which answers this question.e theory is that quasi
indexical non-incompatible disagreements involve conicting proposals for how to
resolve some contextual indeterminacy. en, in §4, I turn to investigate truth value
assessments of “rich”-utterances. In particular, I argue pairs of conicting assessments
(“What X said is true”/“What X said is false”) of a single “rich”-utterance also give
rise to sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses. Predicting this observation
remains an open challenge for every theory of context dependence I am aware of. In
§5, I extend negotiated contextualism to account for this new data. I conclude with
3Instances of this reasoning can be found in: Moore 1922, Hare 1952, Horgan & Timmons 1990,
1992, Smith 1994,Wright 2001, Richard 2004, Egan et al. 2005, Egan 2012, Lasersohn 2005, MacFarlane
2005a, 2007, 2011, 2014, Stephenson 2007, Braun 2012, Willer 2013.
4Sensible non-incompatible rejection is dierent from the notion of “faultless disagreement” (cf.
Ko¨lbel 2002, 2004, Lasersohn 2005, Stojanovic 2007, Huvenes 2014, de Sa 2015). Ko¨lbel denes a fault-
less disagreement as one in which “person A believes (judges) that p and B believes (judges) that not-p
[and] neither A nor B has made a mistake (is at fault)” (Ko¨lbel 2004: 54). So, whereas sensible non-
incompatible rejection involves a sense of disagreement (licensed rejection) without incompatibility in
what is said, faultless disagreement involves incompatibility in what is said (judged/believed) without
fault.
4
Quasi indexicals
some remarks about methodology and avenues of future research.
1 Quasi indexicals and rejection
Suppose A and B engage in a rejection discourse: A assertorically utters ϕ and B as-
sertorically utters, ⌜No, ¬ϕ⌝. We distinguish the following two questions:
▸ Rejection: It made sense that B said, “No, ¬ϕ.”
▸ Incompatibility: At least one of A or B’s claims has to be false.
As we saw in the introduction, when ϕ is a non-indexical sentence, we tend to agree
with both Rejection and Incompatibility; and when ϕ is an indexical sentence, we
tend to disagree with both. However, judgments about Rejection and Incompatibil-
ity should diverge in certain cases involving quasi indexical sentences. In earlier work
(Khoo 2015, Khoo&Knobe 2016), I found preliminary evidence that epistemicmodals
and moral expressions are quasi indexicals. In Khoo 2015, I report experimental ev-
idence of cases in which native English speakers were inclined to reject an epistemic
modal claim even though they did not think that the claim was false, and in my work
with Josh Knobe (Khoo & Knobe 2016) we found experimental evidence of cases in
which, when ϕ is a moral sentence, speakers were inclined to agree with Rejection
and disagree with Incompatibility.5ese experimental results provide evidence that
both epistemic modals andmoral expressions allow for sensible non-incompatible re-
jection discourses, and are, thus, quasi indexicals.
My aim in this section is to extend this methodology to gradable adjectives, focus-
ing on “rich” in particular. To that end, consider the following kind of case:
5In Khoo 2015, participants were told that Fat Tony faked his death and that an inspector found
the planted evidence and concluded “Fat Tony might be dead.” Participants were then asked either
(a) whether they agreed that what the inspector said was false or (b) whether they would reject the
inspector’s claim by saying, “No, Fat Tony is alive—he faked his death.” Khoo found that in this case
participants agreed that they would reject A’s claim, but disagreed with the thought that what A said
was false.is is evidence that, in some cases, speakers are inclined to reject an epistemic modal claim
even though they do not think that it is false.
Khoo&Knobe 2016 had participants read a scenario inwhich anAmerican college student described
a particular action as “wrong” and in which an alien with a radically dierent psychology rejected
the student’s claim, saying instead that the action was “not wrong.” In that case, Khoo & Knobe 2016
found that participants agreed with (the relevant instance of)Rejection, but weakly disagreed with (the
relevant instance of) Incompatibility.
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A and B both believe that a mutual friend, C, has recently won $100,000 in the
lottery. To A, $100,000 is a lot of money, but to B, $100,000 isn’t that much
money (to her, $5,000,000 is a lot of money). A says, “C is rich.” B says, “No, C
is not rich.”
Consider the relevant instances of Rejection and Incompatibility. If you are like me,
you may be inclined to agree more with Rejection than Incompatibility in this case.
If so, that is evidence that “rich” allows for sensible non-incompatible rejection dis-
courses, and thus that “rich” is a quasi indexical. However, you may not be like me in
this regard. When thinking aboutRejection and Incompatibility together, some peo-
ple nd it hard to access their intuitions without thinking through the matter theoret-
ically. Aer all, it is hard to shed the intuitive pull of the Rejection-Incompatibility
Link, which exerts cognitive pressure to line up judgments about Rejection and In-
compatibility. In order to avoid this complication, I think we should turn to exper-
imental data—by asking people about Rejection and Incompatibility separately, we
can explore their intuitions about each without cueing them to think about one in
terms of the other. I now turn to my rst experiment, which aims to explore native
English speaker intuitions about these claims as they apply to an ordinary factual sen-
tence (“Jim won $100,000 in the lottery”), gradable adjective sentence (“Jim is rich”),
and demonstrative sentence (“He won $100,000 in the lottery”).
1.1 Experiment 1: Utterances
240 participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (49 percent male,
mean age 36). Participants were randomly assigned to either the Factual, Gradable, or
Demonstrative condition.ose in the Factual condition read the following vignette:
Factual. David and Naomi are at a bar, watching TV. A friend of theirs, Jim, and
his roommate,Mark, are being interviewed about their favorite restaurants in the
area. David thinks that Jim recently won a lottery prize of $100,000. David also
thinks that $100,000 is a lot of money. Pointing to Jim, David says, “Jim won
$100,000 in the lottery.” Naomi agrees with David that one hundred thousand
dollars is a lot of money, but she does not think that Jim has that much money
(since she thinks he never won a $100,00 lottery prize). Naomi replies, “No, Jim
never won $100,000 in the lottery.”
ose in the Gradable condition read the following vignette:
Gradable. David and Naomi are at a bar, watching TV. A friend of theirs, Jim,
and his roommate, Mark, are being interviewed about their favorite restaurants
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in the area. David thinks that Jim recently won a lottery prize of $100,000. David
also thinks that $100,000 is a lot of money. Pointing to Jim, David says, “Jim is
rich.” Naomi agrees that Jim won $100,000 in the lottery, but to her $100,000 is
not a lot of money (for her, $5,000,000 is a lot of money). Naomi replies, “No,
Jim is not rich.”
Finally, those in the Demonstrative condition read the following vignette:
Demonstrative. Didi and Naomi are at a bar, watching TV. A friend of theirs,
Jim, and his roommate, Mark, are being interviewed about their favorite restau-
rants in the area. David thinks that Jim recently won a lottery prize of $100,000.
David also thinks that $100,000 is a lot of money. Pointing to Jim, David says,
“He won $100,000 in the lottery.” Naomi agrees that Jim won $100,000 in the
lottery, and that $100,000 is a lot of money. But Naomi thinks that they really
should be talking about Mark, and Naomi thinks that Mark has never won any
lottery prizes. Pointing to Mark, Naomi replies, “No, he never won $100,000 in
the lottery.”
Participants were then asked two comprehension questions to make sure they regis-
tered the relevant manipulations (those in the Factual and Gradable conditions an-
swered Check 1 and 2; while those in the Demonstrative condition answered Check 1
and 3):
▸ Check 1: Did bothDavid andNaomi think that Jimwon a lottery prize of $100,000?
▸ Check 2: Did both David and Naomi think that $100,000 was a lot of money?
▸ Check 3: Did both David and Naomi point at the same person?
Next, participants were either assigned to the Rejection or Incompatibility condition,
which varied the Main Question. ose in the Rejection condition were asked how
much they agreed with (the relevant instance of) Rejection; those in the Incompati-
bility condition were asked how much they agreed with Incompatibility:
▸ Rejection: It made sense that Naomi said, “No, ¬ϕ.”
▸ Incompatibility: At least one of David or Naomi’s claims has to be false.
Responses were rated on a seven point scale (from 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 4 = “In
between” to 7 = “Strongly agree”).
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Results and discussion
Results were ltered by whether the participant answered both comprehension ques-
tions correctly, spent more than ve seconds thinking about the Main Question, and
self-reported as a native speaker of English. Of the remaining 194 participants, the
results are summarized in the following chart:6
Figure 1: Comparing Rejection and Incompatibility in Utterances
As seen in the chart, the results for the Factual, Gradable, and Demonstrative condi-
tions are very dierent.7 In the Factual condition, participants strongly agreed with
both Incompatibility and Rejection.8 In the Gradable condition, participants agreed
with Rejection and disagreed with Incompatibility.9 Finally, in the Demonstrative
6Full data is available here: http://osf.io/fp7wq.
7Results were subjected to a 3 (vignette: Factual vs. Gradable vs. Demonstrative) x 2 (question:
Incorrectness vs. Rejection) ANOVA.ere was a main eect of vignette, F(2, 188) = 72.7, p < .001, a
main eect of question, F(1, 188) = 26.9, p < .001, and a signicant interaction, F(2, 188) = 21, p < .001.
8A planned comparison revealed that mean agreement with Incompatibility (M = 6.18, SD = 1.6)
was not signicantly dierent from mean agreement with Rejection (M = 6.69, SD = 0.7), t(64) =
1.65, p = .11.
9A planned comparison revealed that mean agreement with Incompatibility (M = 2.66, SD = 1.6)
was signicantly dierent frommean agreement withRejection (M = 5.97, SD = 1.3), t(67) = 9.42, p <
.001.
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condition, participants disagreed with both Incompatibility and Rejection.10
I am about to conclude that this data provides evidence that “rich” gives rise to sen-
sible non-incompatible rejection discourses. But before I do, I want to anticipate and
reply to two challenges to drawing any such conclusion.e st challenge is straight-
forward: maybe participants do not understand the word “true” in a way that is rel-
evant to this conclusion. Instead, when asked about Incompatibility, participants
really hear it as asking:
▸ Unjustiability: At least one of A or B’s claims has to be unjustied.
If this were right, then we should not infer that “rich” gives rise to sensible non-
incompatible rejection discourses from the fact that participants tend to disagree with
Incompatibility in the Gradable condition—perhaps participants’ responses to this
question are really driven by intuitions about justication, and their disagreementwith
Incompatibility really reects their disagreement with the claim that at least one of
David and Naomi’s claims has to be unjustied.
In reply, I want to draw the reader’s attention to the pattern of responses in the
Factual condition.ere, we nd strong agreement with Incompatibility. Yet, if par-
ticipants generally hear questions about truth as questions about justication, then it
seems they should equally well think that it could be that both David and Naomi’s
claims in the Factual condition were justied (even if they cannot both be true). Yet,
this is not the pattern we nd. Instead, we nd participants strongly agreeing with
Incompatibility in that condition. is suggests that, contra the hypothesis under
consideration, ordinary speakers do distinguish truth from justication, and under-
stand “false” in Incompatibility as meaning falsity.
e second challenge points out that there are two possible interpretations of the
scope of the modal in Incompatibility: high (“It must be that one of their claims is
false”) or low (“One of their claims is such that it must be false”). If participants were
interpreting themodal in Incompatibility as involving low scope, their answerswould
not be evidence that they think David and Naomi’s claims are non-incompatible. To
rule out this possibility, I conducted a followup study, comparing agreement in the
Gradable conditionwith Incompatibility-Low (= Incompatibility) and Incompatibility-
High:
▸ Incompatibility-Low: At least one of David or Naomi’s claims has to be false.
10A planned comparison revealed that mean agreement with Incompatibility (M = 3.03, SD = 2.2)
was not signicantly dierent from mean agreement with Rejection (M = 2.87, SD = 2.1), t(57) =−.30, p = .76.
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▸ Incompatibility-High: It has to be that at least one of David or Naomi’s claims
is false.
Surveying 59 people, I found that there was no signicant dierence in level of agree-
ment with these two statements: participants strongly disagreed with both.11 I con-
clude that participants are understanding Incompatibility as involving high scope,
and hence that their judgments are evidence that they think David and Naomi’s judg-
ments in the Gradable condition are not incompatible in the relevant sense.
I conclude that the intuitions of ordinary native English speakers conrms that
“rich” does give rise to sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses. But notice that
“rich” is both unlike the non-indexical predicate “won $100,000 in the lottery” and the
demonstrative use of “he” in this regard.12 Instead, the behavior of “rich” is similar to
that exhibited by “might” and “wrong” (see Khoo 2015, Khoo & Knobe 2016).is is
a good reason to mark these predicates as a distinct class (quasi indexicals), dierent
from both non-indexicals and indexicals.
Given the behavior of quasi indexicals that distinguishes them both from non-
indexical predicates and indexicals, any theory of quasi indexicals will need to account
for two observations:
1. Why does “rich” (unlike non-indexicals) allow for non-incompatible utterance
pairs?
2. Why does “rich” (unlike indexicals) allow for sensible non-incompatible rejec-
tion discourses?
In the next section, I argue that standard theories of the semantics and pragmatics
of context dependent expressions are not well-suited to provide satisfying answers to
these questions.
11A planned comparison revealed that mean agreement with Incompatibility-Low (M = 2.87, SD =
1.9) was not signicantly dierent from mean agreement with Incompatibility-High (M = 2.93, SD =
2.2), t(57) = −.12, p = .90.
12Of course, we have only looked at one particular case here, so this inference is still somewhat spec-
ulative. More work should be done to conrm that the kinds of cases in which “rich” generates sensible
non-incompatible rejection discourses do not also arise for non-indexical predicates and pure indexi-
cals/demonstratives. Nonetheless, at this stage, I think we are still justied in drawing this preliminary
conclusion.
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2 Challenges to orthodox views
In this section, I argue that the behavior of “rich” revealed in the last section is quite
puzzling from the perspective of most semantic/pragmatic theories. In the next sec-
tion, I discuss a variation on these views in which rejection signals a dispute over
contextual parameters.
It will be helpful to distinguish the various views by characterizing them as post-
semantic variants of a common semantic core, diering only in the assertoric content
they assign to “rich”-sentences relative to a context.13 us, we begin with the fol-
lowing baseline semantics for “rich,” in which ⟦ ⟧ is our semantic value function (a
function that maps expressions to their extensions relative to a context c and index,
which I assume is a pair of a world w and wealth standard g):
Baseline Semantics:⟦“Jim is rich”⟧c,w ,g = 1 i Jim’s personal wealth at w is greater than g.
2.1 Contextualism
Start rst with a simple contextualist theory, according to which the context of ut-
terance c initializes the relevant wealth standard gc, and “Jim is rich” expresses the
possible-worlds proposition that Jim’s wealth exceeds gc (cf. Glanzberg 2007, Kennedy
2007):
Contextualism:
e assertoric content of ϕ at c is {w ∶ ⟦ϕ⟧c,w ,gc = 1}.
In order to predict the non-incompatibility of David and Naomi’s claims, their utter-
ances must take place in dierent contexts (in the same way that two people speaking
to one another occupy dierent contexts when each is speaking respectively). en,
the theory can predict that, say, David expresses the proposition that Jim has more
than $80,000 in personal wealth, while Naomi expresses the proposition that Jim does
not havemore than $5,000,000 in personal wealth—hence, the theory can predict that
David and Naomi assert non-incompatible propositions.
e problemnow facing this kind of view is that it is unclear whyNaomi’s rejection
ofDavid’s claim should be sensible. We can see this by comparing sentences equivalent
to the proposed contents of their respective utterances—utterances of such sentences
13For discussion of the utility of distinguishing the assertoric content and compositional semantic
value of a sentence, see Lewis 1980, Stanley 1997, Ninan 2010, Rabern 2012, 2017, Yalcin 2014.
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yield an odd discourse:
(4) a. David: Jim has more than $80,000 in personal wealth.
b. Naomi: #No, Jim does not have more than $5,000,000 in personal wealth.
is is the result we want for “he,” but not for “rich”—therefore, a simple contextualist
theory that treats them analogously will not be able to explain why Naomi’s rejection
is sensible in the Gradable condition. We will come back to see whether more can be
said for an alternative version of contextualism below, in §3.
2.2 Relativism
Turn next to relativism. Relativism diers from contextualism twice over. First, it
holds that “Jim is rich” has the same assertoric content in every context of utterance:
it expresses a proposition whose truth value varies across both worlds and standards
of wealth. Second, it holds that propositional truth is relative to a context of utterance
cU and a context of assessment cA (cf. MacFarlane 2014):
Relativism
e assertoric content of ϕ at c is {⟨w , g⟩: ⟦ϕ⟧c,w ,g = 1}.
Φ is true as used at cU and assessed at cA i ⟨wcU , gcA⟩ ∈ Φ.
Note: here, ϕ is a sentence and Φ is the proposition it expresses (which, on the rela-
tivist theory is a set of ⟨w , g⟩ pairs). e double relativization of propositional truth
allows the relativist to dene a norm of assertion and rejection that can account for the
pattern of agreement with Rejection in the Gradable vignette (see MacFarlane 2014:
103, 110):14
Assertion Rule
Assert Φ in c only if Φ is true as used at c and assessed at c.
Rejection Rule
An agent in context c2 is permitted to reject an assertion of Φ made at c1 if Φ is
not true as used at c1 and assessed at c2.
According to the Assertion Rule, David and Naomi’s assertions are both reason-
able, since David’s proposition (that Jim is rich) is true as assessed in his context and
14Dierent versions of the norm will dier as to whether it involves truth, knowledge, justication,
and so on.
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Naomi’s proposition (that Jim is not rich) is true as assessed in her context. Further-
more, given the Rejection Rule, Naomi’s rejection of David’s claim is sensible be-
cause his proposition is false as used in his context and assessed at her context.15
us, relativism is nicely positioned to account for the pattern of agreement with
Rejection in the gradable case. Can it also account for the data about Incompati-
bility? Whether it can depends on what other commitments the relativist takes on
board. Suppose rst that the relativist adopts the view that expressions like “David’s
claim” and “What Naomi said” refer to the assertoric contents of David and Naomi’s
assertions (respectively). And furthermore, suppose the relativist also adopts Defla-
tionism:16
Deflationism⟦⌜P is true⌝⟧c,w ,g = 1 i ⟨w , g⟩ ∈ ⟦P⟧c,w ,g .⟦⌜P is false⌝⟧c,w ,g = 1 i ⟨w , g⟩ /∈ ⟦P⟧c,w ,g .
(Note: here, P is some expression that refers to a proposition. Deflationism entails
that the assertoric content of ⌜P is true⌝ is equivalent to the proposition P refers to, and
that the assertoric content of ⌜P is false⌝ is equivalent to the negation of the proposition
P refers to.)
Both of these additional commitments are widely shared by relativists (see for in-
stance MacFarlane 2014: 93). And it isn’t hard to see why they would nd these com-
mitments natural: the resulting theory is one in which “Jim is rich” and “Jim is not
rich” express incompatible propositions, in the sense that, relative to any world and
15Wemay distinguish relativism from non-indexical contextualism:
Non-indexical contextualism
e assertoric content of ϕ at c is {⟨w , g⟩: ⟦ϕ⟧c ,w ,g = 1}.
Φ is true as used at c i ⟨wc , gc⟩ ∈ Φ.
e dierence between relativism and non-indexical contextualism shows up in the fact that (given the
Rejection Rule) the latter predicts that Naomi is permitted to reject David’s claim only if its content
(that Jim is rich) is not true as used at his context—yet it seems that David’s claim is true as used at his
context. e non-indexical contextualist might respond that Naomi’s rejection is sensible in another
sense—because relative to any world, wealth standard pair ⟨w , g⟩, if her proposition is true at ⟨w , g⟩,
David’s proposition is false at ⟨w , g⟩. Even if the non-indexical contextualist adopts this strategy, they
will still have to contend with the challenge to relativism about the Incompatibility judgments below.
16is is a relativist-friendly version of deationism. Someone who thinks that the assertoric con-
tents of sentences are possible-worlds propositions will have to endorse a version of the thesis that
substitutes possible-worlds propositions in place of relativist propositions.
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context of assessment, at least one of them must be false.17
However, given Deflationism, Relativism now faces the inverse of the problem
facing Contextualism.18 Relative to any context of assessment, one of Naomi or
David’s claims must be false. When we (or the participants in the our experiment)
consider the statement Incompatibility, we do so from our context of assessment,
and hence the theory predicts that we should agree with this statement—indeed, if
ordinary English speakers are tacit relativists about “rich,” we expect them to agree
with Incompatibility to the same extent in the Factual and Gradable vignettes. But
that’s not how participants react; rather, they strongly agree with Incompatibility in
the Factual case, but disagree with it in the Gradable case. So, it seems, relativism
about “rich” does not predict its capacity to give rise to non-incompatible rejection
discourses.
Is there a way to defend relativism against this challenge? One possibility would
be to hold that expressions like ⌜X’s claim⌝ do not refer to propositions but rather to
assertions, which determine a pair of a proposition and a context ⟨Φ, c⟩. is would
then allow the relativist to denyDeflationism and instead endorse Reflexive Eval-
uation:
Reflexive Evaluation⟦⌜U is true⌝⟧c,w ,g = 1 i ⟨wcU , gcU ⟩ ∈ ΦU⟦⌜U is false⌝⟧c,w ,g = 1 i ⟨wcU , gcU ⟩ /∈ ΦU
Note: U is an expression that refers to an assertion, which determines a pair of a
17Here are two quotes from relativists where they seem to favor this view. e rst is from Mark
Richard: “In our context, we can evaluate sentences such as ‘Mary is rich’, ‘it is true that Mary is rich’,
or ‘What Didi said is true’ for truth. In doing this, we interpret ‘rich’ and ‘true’ using the standards of
our context, to determine who is rich, what is true. No matter what those standards might be, they
won’t make Mary rich and not rich; nor will they make the claim, that Mary is rich, true and not true”
(Richard 2004: 233).
e second is from John Macfarlane: “Relativism, by contrast, secures preclusion of joint accuracy,
since from any given context of assessment, a single [attitude about wealth] is relevant to the accuracy
of all beliefs about [who is rich]. As assessed from [Naomi’s] context, her belief is accurate and [David’s]
is inaccurate, while as assessed from [David’s] context, his belief is accurate and [Naomi’s] is inaccurate
. . . things tip in favor of relativism if the parties to such disagreements think of themselves not just as
trying to change the other party’s attitudes, but as trying to refute them—where the sign of successful
refutation is not just that the other party now holds the content of her original claim to be false, but
that she retracts her original assertion as inaccurate” (MacFarlane 2014: 132).
18e same problem confronts Macfarlane’s recent expressivist theory of gradable adjectives (Mac-
Farlane 2016). Macfarlane combines his semantics with a deationary theory of truth, yielding the
prediction that, rationally, one must think that one of Naomi or David’s claims are false.
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proposition ΦU and a context cU .19 en, given Reflexive Evaluation, we would
expect participants to judge Incompatibility (“At least one of David or Naomi’s claims
is false”) to be false, insofar as they think that the proposition David expresses (that
Jim is rich) is true relative to his context, and the proposition Naomi expresses (that
Jim is not rich) is true relative to her context.
One obstacle facing this kind of view is that it seems wrong to think that expres-
sions like “David’s claim” refer to assertions. As Macfarlane observes, sentences like:
(5) ??David’s act of assertion is false.
are quite odd (MacFarlane 2005b: 322-323). Furthermore, sentences like, “David’s as-
sertion is true” seemnaturally paraphrased as “e propositionDavid asserted is true,”
which suggests that, in fact, “is true”/“is false” in ordinary English are not predicates of
assertions, but only of propositions (cf. MacFarlane 2008: 93-94).20 But, if we give up
this assumption, and return to the view that “David’s claim” refers to the proposition
David asserted, then the strategy above will not work, since according to Reflexive
Evaluation, “false” is not a predicate of propositions.
2.3 Minimalism
Finally, let’s consider the combination of semantic minimalism with speech act plu-
ralism (Cappelen & Lepore 2005). According to semantic minimalism, “rich” is not
context sensitive at all—rather, it expresses the same objective property in every con-
text. So, “Jim is rich” invariably expresses the minimal proposition that Jim is rich,
19Technically, we need to relativize the assertion denoted by U to c,w , g, but I suppress that rela-
tivization for ease of readability here.
20We might drop the idea that ⌜X’s claim⌝ refers to X’s assertion and just hold that it refers to some-
thing that is representable as a proposition, context pair.is would allow the theory to work formally,
at the expense of making it somewhat mysterious: it is not clear what kind of thing, other than a speech
act, would be representable by a proposition, context pair. Even setting aside that concern, there is
another potential worry with this strategy. To my ear, I do not detect a crucial dierence between:
(i) At least one of David or Naomi’s claims must be false.
(ii) At least one of the things said by David or Naomi must be false.
(iii) Either what David said or what Naomi said must be false.
is would need to be veried experimentally, but if we get the same results for (i), (ii), and (iii), that
would cast doubt on this strategy, as it seems clear that, “e proposition asserted by David” and “What
David said” refer to propositions, not pairs of a proposition and context.
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where this proposition is objectively true or false (not relative to any particular stan-
dard of wealth). Speech act pluralism is the view that utterances of “Jim is rich” will
typically involve the assertion of propositions beyond its minimal content. Among
the propositions David asserts may be that Jim has more than $80,000 in personal
wealth; among the propositions Naomi asserts may be that Jim does not have more
than $5,000,000 in personal wealth.
Here is how the minimalist pluralist could account for the behavior of “rich” in
David andNaomi’s conversation. First, the questionwhetherDavid andNaomi’s claims
are incompatible does not admit of a clear answer, since, according to pluralism, both
David and Naomi have asserted a multitude of propositions. However, since some
of Naomi’s asserted propositions are not incompatible with some of David’s asserted
propositions, the view can predict that this is is why participants are inclined to dis-
agree with Incompatibility. Second, why is Naomi’s rejection sensible? Well, accord-
ing tominimalism, there is a common content that David has armed andNaomi has
denied: the minimal proposition that Jim is rich.us, the view predicts her rejection
makes sense.21
So, minimalist pluralism seems able to predict the pattern we nd with respect to
“rich.” However, there is reason to be unsatised with the minimalist pluralist’s ac-
count of sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses.22 e problem is that the
view threatens to predict too much disagreement with Incompatibility. For instance,
Cappelen and Lepore think that “Jim is rich” is semantically and pragmatically like
“Jim won $100,000 in the lottery” in the sense that both are contextually invariant but
can be used to assert a wide range of propositions.e reason they adopt this view is
to account for the variability of indirect speech reports. In some contexts it will be ap-
propriate to report what David said when he uttered “Jimwon $100,000 in the lottery”
by uttering, “David said that Jim is lucky.”en, according to speech act pluralism, it
must be the case that, in uttering this sentence, David also asserted that Jim is lucky.
But if this is right, and if it is sucient for the falsity of Incompatibility that one of the
propositions asserted by A is not incompatible with one of the propositions asserted
21is is how Cappelen and Lepore aim to predict cross-contextual disagreement: “Semantic Mini-
malism, and no other view, can account for how the same content can be expressed, claimed, asserted,
questioned, investigated, etc. in radically dierent contexts. It is the semantic content that enables audi-
ences who nd themselves in radically dierent contexts to understand each other, to agree or disagree,
to question and debate with each other. It can serve this function simply because it is the sort of content
that is largely immune to contextual variations.” (Cappelen & Lepore 2005: 152).
22ere are also independent objections to minimalist pluralism: see Gross 2006, Hawthorne 2006,
Korta & Perry 2006, Recanati 2006, Stainton 2006, Szabo´ 2006, Travis 2006. For replies, see Cappelen
& Lepore 2006a,b.
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by B, then the view should predict disagreement with Incompatibility even in the Fac-
tual vignette. Yet, this is not what we nd: in that condition, ordinary speakers think
that Naomi and David’s claims are incompatible.us, there is a tension between the
goal of speech act pluralism to account for indirect speech reports and to account for
our data about incompatible claims.23
We have thus seen how three leading views struggle to account for the behavior of
“rich” discussed in the previous section. What we need is a way to make sense of how
two “rich”-utterances may not be incompatible, and yet still license rejection. In the
next section, I oer a new way to generate this prediction.
3 Negotiated contextualism
In this section, I sketch a theory that I call negotiated contextualism.e view builds
on insights from Barker 2002, 2013, DeRose 2004, Plunkett & Sundell 2013, Silk 2016,
Khoo & Knobe 2016, although I implement these insights in a new and, I think, im-
proved way (a brief comparison of the views follows in §3.1). I show how this theory
applies to gradable adjectives like “rich” and explains why they, but not demonstratives
like “he,” give rise to non-incompatible rejection discourses.
I will build my theory atop the Baseline Semantics from the previous section.
One key dierence between negotiated contextualism and the prior views discussed is
that, for quasi indexicals like “rich,” the context is typically indeterminate with respect
to the relevant parameter (in this case, the standard of wealth g). Here is how I propose
we think about this kind of indeterminacy. Following Lewis 1979, I will make use of
the notion of a conversational score, which I model as a set of indices of evaluation
(given our assumption above, this will be a set of world, wealth standard pairs). e
conversational score is distinct from the context c (call c a Kaplanian context, to help
keep things straight), which determines a unique conversational score Sc, which in
turn determines a context set CSc = {w ∶ ∃i ∈ Sc ∶ wi = w} (cf. Stalnaker 1978,
2002). However, the conversational score is more general—for our purposes, it also
determines a set of wealth standards {g1, g2, g3, . . . }.24
23To avoid this challenge, one might drop this independent commitment of speech act pluralism.
e nal comparison between such a view and negotiated contextualism must await another day.
24I want to remain mostly neutral for now about what features of the context determine the conver-
sational score (compare the discussion in Lewis 1979: 346). One possibility is that the score is deter-
mined by features of the mental states of the conversational participants (similar to Stalnaker 2002).
On this account, it is the participants’ beliefs that determine the common ground, and their (perhaps
non-cognitive) attitudes towards wealth that determine the wealth standards of the score. Another
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e content of an expression is something that can bemodeled as a function from
worlds to its extension at that world. So, for instance, the content of a one-place predi-
cate of individuals is a property (modeled as a function fromworlds to a function from
individuals to truth values), and the content of a sentence is a proposition (modeled as
a function from worlds to truth values), and so on. Having distinguished the Kapla-
nian context from the conversational score, we distinguish directly context-sensitive
expressions from score-sensitive expressions. Directly context sensitive expressions
have dierent contents relative to dierent contexts, but not relative to dierent scores,
while score sensitive expressions have dierent contents relative to dierent conver-
sational scores. Pure indexicals dier from quasi indexicals in that the former are
directly context sensitive and the latter score-sensitive. Very oen, a score sensitive
expression will be indeterminate in content because the conversational score contains
indices with dierent values for the parameter relevant to determining the content of
that expression.
To take a relevant example, suppose that the score S contains two indices i1 and i2,
where gi1 ≠ gi2 .en, the content of “rich” relative to this score will be indeterminate
between:
λwλx . x’s personal wealth at w is greater than gi1 .
λwλx . x’s personal wealth at w is greater than gi2 .
We will model indeterminate contents by letting ⟦e⟧c be the set of contents which
e is indeterminate between; call the members of this set e’s content candidates at c.
Formally:
Content:⟦e⟧c = { f ∶ ∃i ∈ Sc ∶ f = λw . ⟦e⟧c,w ,g i}.
In a framework inwhich a sentence’s content (in some context) is indeterminate across
a range of propositions, what do we say about the truth value of such a sentence as
uttered in that context? Here, I propose that we supervaluate across the sentence’s
content candidates, as follows:
possibility is that the score is determined by what is on the public conversational record, which reects
what speech acts have been made in the conversation. A third possibility is that there is no interper-
sonal score, but rather each person has their own subjective score.is nal possibility would require
some bookkeeping to bring it in line with the rest of the theory sketched below, but I do think the two
are fully compatible.
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Truth at a context:
(i) ϕ is true at c,w if ∀p ∈ ⟦ϕ⟧c: p(w) = 1.
(ii) ϕ is false at c,w if ∀p ∈ ⟦ϕ⟧c: p(w) = 0.
(iii) ϕ is indeterminate (neither true nor false) otherwise.
us, whenever the indeterminacy in wealth standards in c results in the content of
some “rich”-sentence being indeterminate between propositions p1 and p2, where p1
is true atw but p2 is false atw, then that “rich”-sentence will be indeterminate (neither
true nor false) at c,w. An example of this is when S contains indices i1 and i2 and Jim’s
personal wealth at w is greater than gi1 , but not greater than gi2 .
So, what is it to assertively utter a sentence, on this kind of framework? We dis-
tinguish the content of a sentence ϕ from its update value. Let the update value of a
sentence in a context c be ∣ϕ∣c. We dene the update value by abstracting on the entire
index, rather than just the world parameter:25
Update value:∣ϕ∣c = {⟨w , g⟩: ⟦ϕ⟧c,w ,g = 1}.
To assertively utter a sentence at c is to propose changing its conversational score as
follows:
Assertion:
To assertively utter ϕ at c is to propose changing Sc to Sc ∩ ∣ϕ∣c.
us understood, assertion aims to change the conversational score in two ways: one,
by adding some factual information to the common ground, and two, by rening var-
ious contextual parameters—thus advocating for a particular way of thinking about,
or describing, that factual information. us, an assertion of “Jim is rich” proposes
to make it settled in the context that Jim has enough personal wealth to count as rich
in that context. It does so by proposing to eliminate all those world, wealth standard
pairs from the score on which Jim’s wealth does not exceed the wealth standard.
We turn now to the predictions of the theory. Recall that it is common ground in
David and Naomi’s conversation that Jim has just won $100,000 when the following
25Formally, update values as I have dened them are analogous to Gibbard 1990’s fact-norm contents
(sets of pairs of a world and norm), or Gibbard 2003’s fact-plan contents (sets of pairs of a world and
hyperplan). However, our views dier in an important respect: I do not identify this kind of object as the
content of a sentence. Combining Gibbardian expressivism with a minimalist theory of truth will yield
the unwanted prediction that David and Naomi’s claims in the Gradable condition are incompatible
(such that at least one must be false).
19
Quasi indexicals
exchange takes place:
(6) a. David: Jim is rich.
b. Naomi: No, Jim isn’t rich.
Negotiated contextualism predicts, in this case, that:
(a) David and Naomi’s claims are not incompatible, and
(b) Naomi’s rejection of David’s claim is sensible.
e theory predicts that David and Naomi’s claims are not incompatible as follows.
David and Naomi have diverging attitudes about howmuch wealth is needed to count
as rich: as such, the conversational score of their context contains at least (let’s sup-
pose) g1 = $80, 000 and g2 = $5, 000, 000. us, since Jim in fact has $100,000, we
predict that both David and Naomi’s claims are neither true nor false in their context.
And, therefore, we predict that their claims are not incompatible.26
e theory predicts that Naomi’s rejection is sensible as follows. Accepting David’s
proposalwould be to eliminate all the g2-indices from the score, while acceptingNaomi’s
proposal would be to eliminate all the g1-indices from the score. erefore, there is
no non-trivial (that is, non-empty) conversational score that can accept both David
and Naomi’s update proposals. As such, the only way for Naomi’s proposal to have
a chance at being (non-trivially) accepted is for her to reject David’s proposal, thus
keeping the g2-indices in the score.us, it makes sense why she would reject David’s
proposal—she is oering a counter-proposal about now to resolve the indeterminacy
in their conversational score.27
26With a slight modication, negotiated contextualism can also predict that David and Naomi’s
claims could both be true.e strategy is to individuate contexts more nely, so that David and Naomi
occupy dierent contexts.en, it could be that the proposition David expresses in his context and the
proposition Naomi expresses in her context will both be true (and hence compatible). We then dene
the conversational score of some conversation as the union of the indices le open by the contexts of
each of the conversational participants. David and Naomi’s assertions can be understood as compet-
ing proposals to update the conversational score of their conversation, which amounts to proposals to
change the other’s mind about both how much wealth Jim has and how much wealth it should take to
count as rich. us, with this small tweak, my theory can predict that David and Naomi’s claims can
both be true. Of course, it remains an open empirical question whether ordinary speakers would share
this judgment in the Gradable case. I set this aside as a question to explore in future work.
27is account is schematic, and relies only on the technical machinery. As such, it is compatible
with various accounts of the underlying disagreement. One possibility builds on the assumption that
the conversational score is determined by the attitudes of the conversational participants. In that case,
David’s assertion amounts to a proposal toNaomi that they both adopt a certain attitude towards wealth
and Naomi’s rejection then involves communicating her refusal to adopt that attitude toward wealth.
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But now what about pure indexicals like “he,” as used by David and Naomi in the
Demonstrative condition? Why do pure indexicals not give rise to non-incompatible
rejection discourses? Negotiated contextualism predicts they do not—their contents
are not subject to contextual negotiation since they are directly context sensitive. As-
sume for now the following simplistic semantics for “he”:⟦“he”⟧c,w ,g = the most salient male in c.
Suppose David is the speaker of c1, Naomi the speaker of c2, and that the most salient
male in c1 is Jim, while the most salient male in c2 is Mark; suppose also that Jim won
the lottery at w, but Mark did not. en negotiated contextualism predicts that “He
won the lottery” is true at c1,w and “He did not win the lottery” is true at c2,w. Hence,
both David and Naomi’s claims may both be true at their respective contexts. But
now notice that the update values of David and Naomi’s sentences (in their respective
contexts) are compatible, since there are conversational scores that can non-trivially
accept both:
▸ ∣“He won the lottery”∣c1 = {⟨w , g⟩ ∶ Jim won the lottery at w}.
▸ ∣“He did not win the lottery”∣c2 = {⟨w , g⟩ ∶Mark did not win the lottery at w}.
us, there is no reason for Naomi to reject David’s claim in the Demonstrative con-
dition, and so we predict that her rejection there is not sensible.
Negotiated contextualism is a version of contextualism—the content of “rich” de-
pends crucially on a parameter of the context. However, unlike orthodox contextualist
theories, it holds that assertive utterances are oen the means by which we negotiate
the values of these contextual parameters. In a slogan: we communicate both to ex-
change information but also to coordinate on how to describe and think about that
information.
3.1 Comparisons with nearby views
As mentioned above, negotiated contextualism draws inspiration from Barker 2002,
2013, Plunkett & Sundell 2013, Silk 2016. Here, I argue that, despite their similarities,
there is a reason to prefer negotiated contextualism to these other views. While these
other views are in a position to predict sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses,
only negotiated contextualism accounts for the fact that such discourses arise for quasi
indexicals but not pure indexicals.
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Negotiated contextualism is closely related to the theory proposed by Barker 2002
and later elaborated upon in Barker 2013. Both theories share a commitment to the
idea that utterances of gradable adjective sentences can propose two kinds of changes
to the context: a change to the shared factual information, and a change to the stan-
dards something needs to meet to count as satisfying the positive form of that ad-
jective. However, negotiated contextualism predicts that sensible non-incompatible
rejection discourses should not arise with pure indexicals, whereas the account given
in Barker’s theory does not predict this. Here is the relevant quote from Barker about
“faultless disagreement”:
“My diagnosis of the kind of faultless disagreement that arises from dis-
putes about vague predicates, including predicates of personal taste, then,
is that it is a combination of two things: the irrelevance of facts concern-
ing the part of the world under discussion (in this case, the heights of
the individuals being discussed) for resolving the dispute; and symmetry
between the discourse participants with respect to the judgments under
consideration (that no one has superior authority when it comes to as-
sessing communicative norms).” (Barker 2013: 249).
SinceBarker does not explicitly discuss sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses,
I will assume here that this account of “faultless disagreements” would also be Barker’s
preferred account of sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses. Given this ac-
count, there is nothing in principle that prevents it from extending to pure indexicals.
For instance, in the Demonstrative condition above, the subject matter of the two
claims does not resolve the dispute (both parties agree that Jim won the lottery and
Mark did not), and the two speakers have the same authority with respect to setting
the conversational parameters. So, Barker’s account does not predict the distinction
between quasi indexicals and pure indexicals.
Another view that is similar to negotiated contextualism is Silk 2016’s discourse
contextualism. Silk endorses a standard contextualist view of quasi indexicals (epis-
temicmodals, gradable adjectives, predicates of taste), but holds that very oen speak-
ers make incompatible presuppositions about the value of the relevant contextual pa-
rameter. According to Silk’s view, in the Gradable condition, David presupposes that
the wealth standards parameter is low enough that someone with $100,000 counts as
rich according to it, while Naomi presupposes that the wealth standards parameter
is high enough that someone with $100,000 does not count as rich according to it.
Silk predicts that Naomi’s rejection of David’s claim is sensible here because they have
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these incompatible presuppositions about the context (see Silk 2016: 36-7). Nonethe-
less, David’s presupposition ensures that his utterance is true, while Naomi’s presup-
position ensures that her utterance is true, so their claims are compatible.
Despite their similarities, our theories dier about themechanismgenerating these
sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses: for Silk, the crucial point is that the
speakers have incompatible presuppositions about the relevant contextual parameter,
while for me it is that the speakers have proposed incompatible updates to the context
as part of their assertions (and so, for me the speakers may both agree about their pre-
suppositions about how the context is—their disagreement is over how to change it).
An important dierence between these accounts is that Silk’s explanation seems to ex-
tend to pure indexicals, thus incorrectly predicting that pure indexicals can also give
rise to sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses. All that is needed to generate
such a disagreement, according to Silk, is that the speakers assert compatible proposi-
tions but have incompatible presuppositions about the relevant contextual parameter.
And that seems to be the case in the Demonstrative condition in our experiment—
David presupposes that the most salient male is Jim, while Naomi presupposes that
the most salient male is Mark. As such, it is not clear, according to Silk’s theory, why
Naomi’s rejection is non-sensible in that case, but not in the Gradable case.28,29
Finally, I compare my theory with Plunkett & Sundell 2013’s theory of metalin-
guistic negotiation, which can also predict sensible non-incompatible rejection dis-
28One possible response here is to hold that what David presupposes is that the most salient male at
t1 is Jim, while Naomi presupposes that the most salient male at t2 is Mark. If this were correct, then
their presuppositions would not be in conict and Silk’s theory would not predict sensible rejection in
that case. However, this kind of response merely pushes back the issue one step. Now, the question
becomes: why doesn’t the same thing hold for wealth standards? If it did—if David presupposes that
the wealth standard is g1 at t1, while Naomi presupposes that it is g2 at t2—then there would likewise
be no conict in their presuppositions, and so Silk’s view would not predict that rejection is sensible
in this case. e challenge here is to explain what is dierent about the role of context in xing the
contents of indexicals versus its role in xing the contents of quasi indexicals, and Silk’s view is silent
on this matter.
29ere is a wrinkle in the dialectic I pause to iron out. If Naomi mistakenly thinks that David was
referring to Mark, then we might think her rejection of his claim is sensible, on the grounds that, given
what she thinks about the context, it makes sense for her to reject David’s claim. But I take it that
this is not how contextual negotiation is supposed to work on Silk’s theory in general—sensible non-
incompatible rejections discourses involving “rich” need not require that the speakers are confused
about what each are saying. My point is thus that, in whatever way the speakers have incompatible
presuppositions about the wealth standard parameter needed to generate a sensible rejection discourse
on Silk’s theory, it seems that the speakers may have incompatible presuppositions about the salient
male in just the same way, thus generating a sensible rejection discourse involving “he” where there
intuitively isn’t one.
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courses. According to Plunkett and Sundell’s theory, such cases arise because the two
parties commit themselves to incompatible metalinguistic propositions about what
the words uttered ought to mean. Negotiated contextualism diers in two ways from
the theory of metalinguistic negotiation. For one, it is less committal about the na-
ture of the disagreement underlying sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses.
Plunkett and Sundell think that such disagreement is metalinguistic—about the terms
involved.at diagnosis is compatible with negotiated contextualism, I think, but ne-
gotiated contextualism does not require it. Secondly, Plunkett and Sundell’s theory
extends to predict sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses involving pure in-
dexicals.is is because all that is needed to generate a sensible rejection discourse is
that the speakers endorse incompatible metalinguistic propositions. So, for instance,
David may endorse the proposition that “he” on this occasion ought to refer to Jim
while Naomi may endorse the proposition that “he” on that same occasion ought to
have referred to Mark. Yet, the empirical evidence from the Demonstrative condition
above suggests that this is not sucient to yield a sensible rejection discourse involving
the sentence “He won $100,000 in the lottery.”
I want to emphasize that I am not claiming that my challenges to these related
views are decisive. For instance, I have not, for the sake of space, considered what
kind of moves might be available as responses to my challenges. In particular, it seems
open to me for many of these views to join forces with negotiated contextualism by
embracing the distinctions between Kaplanian context and conversational score, and
between the content and update value of sentences. In the next section, I turn now
to discuss a related property of “rich” (and, I think quasi indexicals more broadly)
involving conicting truth value assessments. As wewill see shortly, this data provides
another challenge to both orthodox semantic/pragmatic theories, aswell as thesemore
nuanced theories. However, I will argue that negotiated contextualism has the ability
to predict this puzzling data.
4 Quasi indexicals and assessment
In the introduction, I mentioned a second property of quasi indexicals that distin-
guishes them from pure indexicals, which is that two surface conicting assessments
(“What he said is true”/“What he said is false”) targeting a single “rich”-utterance also
give rise to sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses.is property is not shared
by pure indexical sentences, as we can see in the following example:
(7) a. Lucy (in Washington): It is raining here.
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b. Wally (in Arizona): What Lucy said is true.
c. Dougie (in Las Vegas): No, what Lucy said is false.
By uttering “It is raining here,” Lucy asserts that it is raining inWashington. Wally, who
is in Arizona, targets the content of Lucy’s assertion and says that it is true using the
“What Lucy said” locution; in doing so, he says that it is raining inWashington (where
Lucy is). Dougie, who is in Las Vegas, also targets the content of Lucy’s assertion and
says that it is false; in doing so, he says that it is not raining in Washington (where
Lucy is). Here we have a sensible rejection discourse, but one in which the claims
made are clearly incompatible: notice that Wally has not said that it is raining where
he is (Arizona) and likewise Dougie has not said that it is not raining where he is (in
Las Vegas).
In contrast with pure indexicals, which behave like non-indexicals when it comes
to conicting assessments, I will argue that conicting assessments of “rich”-sentences
do admit of sensible non-incompatible rejection discourses. is suggests another
property of quasi indexicals that distinguishes them from both pure indexicals and
non-indexicals. As before, my evidence for this claim comes from experimental data
about ordinary speaker intuitions.
4.1 Experiment 2: Assessments
251 participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (52 percent male,
mean age 35). Participants were randomly assigned to either the Factual, Gradable, or
Demonstrative condition.ose in the Factual condition read the following vignette:
Factual. Beth is giving a speech at a party about her friend Jim. At the end of her
speech, Beth points to Jim and says, “Jim won $100,000 in the lottery.” Aer the
speech, three friends, Sue, David and Naomi, are talking. Sue asks, “Is what Beth
just said true?” David thinks that Jim recently won a lottery prize of $100,000.
He thinks that $100,000 is a lot of money. David says, “What Beth said is true.”
Naomi agrees with David that $100,000 is a lot of money, but she does not think
that Jim has thatmuchmoney (since she thinks that he has never won a $100,000
prize). Naomi replies, “No, what Beth said is false.”
ose in the Gradable condition read the following vignette:
Gradable. Beth is giving a speech at a party about her friend Jim. At the end
of her speech, Beth points to Jim and says, “Jim is rich.”Aer the speech, three
friends, Sue, David and Naomi, are talking. Sue asks, “Is what Beth just said
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true?” David thinks that Jim recently won a lottery prize of $100,000. He thinks
that $100,000 is a lot of money. David says, “What Beth said is true.” Naomi
agrees that Jim won $100,000 in the lottery, but to her $100,000 is not a lot of
money (for her, $5,000,000 is a lot of money). Naomi replies, “No, what Beth
said is false.”
Finally, those in the Demonstrative condition read the following vignette:
Demonstrative. Beth is giving a speech at a party about her friend Jim. At the
end of her speech, Beth points to Jim and says, “He won $100,000 in the lot-
tery.”Aer the speech, three friends, Sue, David and Naomi, are talking. Sue
asks, “Is what Beth just said true?” David thinks that Jim recently won a lottery
prize of $100,000. He thinks that $100,000 is a lot of money. David says, “What
Beth said is true.” Naomi agrees that Jim won $100,000 in the lottery, and that
$100,000 is a lot of money. But Naomi thinks that they really should be talking
about Jim’s brotherMark, andNaomi thinks thatMark has never won any lottery
prizes. Pointing to Mark, Naomi replies, “No, what Beth said is false.”
Participants were then asked two comprehension questions to make sure they regis-
tered the relevant manipulations (those in the Factual and Gradable conditions an-
swered Check 1 and 2; while those in the Demonstrative condition answered Check 1
and 3):
▸ Check 1: Did bothDavid andNaomi think that Jimwon a lottery prize of $100,000?
▸ Check 2: Did both David and Naomi think that $100,000 was a lot of money?
▸ Check 3: Did both David and Naomi point at the same person?
Next, participants were either assigned to the Rejection or Incompatibility condition,
which varied the Main Question. ose in the Rejection condition were asked how
much they agreed with Rejection; those in the Incompatibility condition were asked
how much they agreed with Incompatibility:
▸ Rejection: It made sense that Naomi said, “No, what Beth said is false.”
▸ Incompatibility: At least one of David or Naomi’s claims has to be false.
As before, responses were rated on a seven point scale (from 1 = “Strongly disagree”
to 4 = “In between” to 7 = “Strongly agree”).
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Results and discussion
Answers were ltered bywhether the participant answered both comprehension ques-
tions correctly, spent more than ve seconds thinking about the Main Question, and
self-reported as a native speaker of English. Of the remaining 198 participants, the
results are summarized in the following chart:30
Figure 2: Comparing Rejection and Incompatibility in Assessments
As seen in the chart, the results are dierent across the three vignettes.31 In the Factual
condition, as with the Utterance experiment, participants strongly agreed with both
Incompatibility andRejection.32 In theGradable condition, as with theUtterances
experiment, participants agreedwithRejection and disagreedwith Incompatibility.33
30Full data is available at http://osf.io/fp7wq.
31Results were subjected to a 3 (vignette: Factual vs. Gradable vs. Demonstrative) x 2 (question:
Incorrectness vs. Rejection) ANOVA.ere was a main eect of vignette, F(2, 192) = 17.8, p < .001,
but no main eect of question, F(1, 192) = 0.95, p = .76, and there was a signicant interaction eect,
F(2, 192) = 13.9, p < .001.
32A planned comparison revealed that mean agreement with Incompatibility (M = 6.06, SD = 1.6)
was not signicantly dierent from mean agreement with Rejection (M = 5.50, SD = 2.0), t(64) =−1.27, p = .21.
33A planned comparison revealed that mean agreement with Incompatibility (M = 3.14, SD = 2.0)
was signicantly dierent from mean agreement with Rejection (M = 5.03, SD = 1.87), t(68) =
4.07, p < .001.
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Finally, in the Demonstrative condition, unlike in the Utterances experiment, there
was a signicant dierence between agreement with Incompatibility and Rejection,
with participants more strongly agreeing with the former than the latter (the inverse
of the Gradable condition).34
When assessing an ordinary factual claim, there is no dierence in agreement with
Incompatibility and Rejection. is is to be expected: the factual claim expresses
an ordinary proposition, which is either true or false; this proposition is what is re-
ferred to by David and Naomi’s utterances of “What Beth said is true”/“What Beth
said is false,” and this is why their claims are incompatible. Compare this with the
Demonstrative condition. Here, we know that “he” is context sensitive, but nonethe-
less Beth’s utterance of it determinately expresses a proposition referring to Jim. David
andNaomi’s utterances of “What Beth said is true”/“What Beth said is false” both refer
to this proposition, which is again either true or false, and hence David and Naomi’s
claims are again incompatible.
Despite a similar pattern with respect to Incompatibility, we nd responses in
the Factual and Demonstrative conditions patterning dierently with respect to Re-
jection: there is broad agreement with Rejection in the Factual case, but weak dis-
agreement with it in the Demonstrative case.ere seems to be a natural explanation
for this pattern. When Beth points to Jim and says, “He won $100,000 in the lottery,”
the content of her claim is directly xed by the context—it is that Jim won $100,000 in
the lottery. When David and Naomi made their claims (“What Beth said is . . . ”), they
refer to this proposition and predicate either truth or falsity of it. Since this propo-
sition is either true or false, at least one of their claims must be false. Yet, Naomi’s
rejection here does not make sense, given how she is described and her communica-
tive intentions. She agrees with David about all the facts relevant to Beth’s claim. But
she thinks they should be talking about Mark. Yet, she cannot express this disagree-
ment using the sentence she in fact utters. is accounts for why we nd Naomi’s
rejection non-sensible.
In contrast with both the Factual and Demonstrative conditions, we nd that in
the Gradable condition, the two assessments of Beth’s claim behave exactly like the
two “rich”-utterances in the Utterances experiment.is is evidence that conict-
ing truth value assessments of a single “rich”-claim do sometimes give rise to sensible
non-incompatible rejection discourses. But how does the theory of negotiated con-
textualism from §3 predict this result? I turn to this question in the nal section.
34A planned comparison revealed that mean agreement with Incompatibility (M = 4.75, SD = 2.2)
was signicantly dierent from mean agreement with Rejection (M = 3.17, SD = 2.0), t(60) =−2.93, p = .005.
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5 Negotiated contextualism: assessments
It might help to quickly summarize the data we need to account for. In the Gradable
conditions of both the Utterances experiment and the Assessments experiment,
ordinary speakers tend to think (i) that David and Naomi’s claims are not incompati-
ble, and (ii) that, nonetheless, Naomi’s rejection ofDavid’s claimwas sensible. Further-
more, this pattern does not extend to either the Factual or Demonstrative conditions
in either experiment.
(8) Utterances
a. David: Jim is rich.
b. Naomi: No, Jim is not rich.
(9) Assessments
a. Beth: Jim is rich.
b. David: What Beth said is true.
c. Naomi: No, what Beth said is false.
ere is a tempting simple explanation for this pattern of data. Perhaps people are tacit
dialetheists—in particular, they simply think that it can be true that Jim is rich and
false that Jim is rich, end of story. However, this kind of explanation does not explain
why rejection is sensible in both cases. One would expect that if dialetheism is true
(and tacitly accepted), there should be no (felt) conict between David and Naomi’s
claims. Dialetheism predicts that both claims are objectively correct—so what could
they be arguing over?
Notice as well that other theories that are capable of accounting for sensible non-
incompatible rejection discourses involving two “rich”-claims also struggle to account
for the same data concerning conicting assessments. Each of the views discussed in
§3.1 are either not eshed out enough to make a prediction here (Barker 2002, 2013),
or assign a straightforward possible-worlds content to sentences and thus cannot pre-
dict that two conicting assessments of a single claim could ever be non-incompatible
(Plunkett & Sundell 2013, Silk 2016).35
35I pause to consider a possible way out for a contextualist who already has an account of the data
from §1. e idea is that ⌜What X said⌝ has two interpretations: on one, it refers to the proposition
X asserted, while on the other it refers (in context c) to the proposition that the sentence X uttered
would have expressed had that sentence been uttered in c. If this were so, then David’s utterance in
the Gradable condition would have a reading that is equivalent to “Jim is rich” were he to have uttered
it, and Naomi’s utterance in that condition would have a reading equivalent to “Jim is not rich” where
she to have uttered it. en, the contextualist could just port over her explanation of sensible non-
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But wait—it seems that negotiated contextualism should alsomake the exact same
prediction. e theory predicts that the content of “Jim is rich” in some context c is
either (a) determinately true, (b) determinately false, or (c) indeterminate. But then,
no matter what, either an assessment of its content as “true” is false or an assessment
of its content as “false” is false—there is no other possibility. So, it seems that nego-
tiated contextualism should predict that at least one of David or Naomi’s assessments
of Beth’s claim must be false, and hence that the theory is also unable to account for
the Assessments data.
However, this only follows given that the locution “What Beth said” univocally
refers to the content of Beth’s assertion. But remember that negotiated contextual-
ism predicts that there is a second semantic object nearby—the update value of Beth’s
sentence—which oers a way out for the theory. My proposal is to use this feature
to generate a new account of truth value assessments.e proposal is that “says” and
“claim”-locutions like “What Beth said” and “Beth’s claim” are ambiguous and may
refer to either the content of the asserted sentence, or its update value:
What is said
a. ⟦⌜What X saidcontent⌝⟧c,w ,g = the content of the sentence X uttered.
b. ⟦⌜What X saidupdate⌝⟧c,w ,g = the update value of the sentence X uttered.
In the case above, where Beth utters “Jim is rich” in context cBeth we have:
▸ ⟦“What Beth saidcontent”⟧c,w ,g = ⟦“Jim is rich”⟧cBeth .▸ ⟦“What Beth saidupdate”⟧c,w ,g = ∣“Jim is rich”∣cBeth .
On its content interpretation, “What Beth said” refers to the content of Beth’s claim at
her context (which may be indeterminate—hence, it refers to the content candidates
incompatible rejection discourses from the Utterances case to the Assessments case. One reason
I do not favor this strategy comes from the data in the Demonstrative condition. If “What Beth said”
(targeting Beth’s utterance of “Jim is rich”) in c could refer to the proposition “Jim is rich” would have
expressed had it been uttered in c, then it should also be able to do so when it targets Beth’s utter-
ance of, “He won $100,000 in the lottery.” But if that is so, then we would expect the same pattern of
agreement with Incompatibility in both the Gradable and Demonstrative conditions.is is because
in the Demonstrative condition, David’s utterance would have a reading that is equivalent to “He won
$100,000 in the lottery” were he to have uttered it (and hence would be claiming that Jim won the
lottery), and Naomi’s utterance in that condition would have a reading equivalent to “He did not win
$100,000 in the lottery” where she to have uttered it (and hence would be claiming that Mark did not
win the lottery, since she is trying to talk about Mark). In that case, their claims should be compatible,
contra the data in the Demonstratives condition.
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of Beth’s claim at her context). On the update interpretation, “What Beth said” refers
to the update value of Beth’s claim at her context.
Corresponding to these two meanings for ⌜What X said⌝ are two meanings (both
deationary) for “is true” (and likewise for “is false”):
Truth predicate
a. ⟦“is truecontent”⟧c,w ,g = λP⟨s⟨s,t⟩⟩ . ∀p ∈ P ∶ p(w) = 1.
b. ⟦“is trueupdate”⟧c,w ,g = λu⟨i ,t⟩ . u(⟨w , g⟩) = 1
To clarifymy terminology here: I assume that propositions are of type ⟨s, t⟩ (functions
fromworlds, of type s to truth values of type t), and that update values are of type ⟨i , t⟩
(functions from indices, of type i to truth values). Given this semantics, we compute
the following:
▸ ⟦“What Beth saidcontent is truecontent”⟧c,w ,g = 1 i∀p ∈ ⟦“Jim is rich”⟧cBeth : p(w) = 1 i
“Jim is rich” is true at cBeth,w.▸ ⟦“What Beth saidupdate is trueupdate”⟧c,w ,g = 1 i∣“Jim is rich”∣cBeth(g)(w) = 1 i
Jim’s personal wealth at w is greater than g i⟦“Jim is rich”⟧c,w ,g = 1.
With these assumptions in place, we make the following predictions.
First, we predict that David and Naomi’s claims are not incompatible as follows.
We propose that the sentence “What Beth said is true,” as uttered by David, is inter-
preted as referring to the update value of Beth’s utterance (more on the motivation for
this assumption below).en, we predict that the update value and content of David’s
utterance is the same as what it would have been had he simply uttered, “Jim is rich.”
e same goes for Naomi’s utterance of “What Beth said is false”—it also refers to the
update value of Beth’s claim, and hence the update value and content of Naomi’s utter-
ance is the same as what it would have been had she simply uttered, “Jim is not rich.”
e contents of these two utterances are not incompatible; the explanation here is the
same as above for the Gradable condition Utterances experiment. Both contents
are indeterminate (since there are wealth standards relative to which each is true and
wealth standards relative to which each is false), and hence neither true nor false.
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Furthermore, Naomi’s rejection of David’s claim is sensible for the same reason as
in the Gradable condition of the Utterances experiment. Since it is presupposed in
their context that Jim has $100,000, David is proposing to update the score by elim-
inating all of the wealth standards greater than $100,000, while Naomi is proposing
to update the score by eliminating all of the wealth standards less than or equal to
$100,000. Since no non-trivial score can accept both updates, we predict that it makes
sense for Naomi to reject David’s proposal.
But now notice a wrinkle in our account, which is that Incompatibility also uses
claim-targeting language:
▸ Incompatibility: At least one of David or Naomi’s claims must be false.
Our explanation why people disagree with Incompatibility is that they think that the
contents of David and Naomi’s utterances are such that neither has to be false. But we
have now proposed that claim-targeting language (like “X’s claim” or “What X said”)
can also refer to the update value of an utterance. So, it seems that we threaten our ini-
tial explanation here. It seems that we have to assume that participants will naturally
interpret “claim” in Incompatibility as referring to the contents of David/Naomi’s ut-
terances, and “What Beth said,” as uttered by David/Naomi in the Assessments case
as referring to the update value of Beth’s utterance. Is there any independent motiva-
tion for these assumptions?
I think there is. A reason to expect that participants will naturally interpret “claim”
in Incompatibility as referring to the contents of David/Naomi’s utterances is that In-
compatibility is trivially true if interpreted as about update values—interpreted in
that way, it is equivalent to “Either Jim isn’t rich, or Jim is rich.” Since this statement is
obviously true (so-interpreted), it would be reasonable to expect participants to look
for a non-trivial interpretation (if there is one), which would lead them to interpret
“claim” as referring to the contents of David/Naomi’s utterances. So-interpreted, In-
compatibility is false in theGradable condition and true in the Factual/Demonstrative
conditions, and thus its truth value is non-trivial.
So why interpret David/Naomi’s truth value assessments as about the update value
of Beth’s utterance? One plausible answer is that this is the most natural interpretation
of what David and Naomi are proposing, given the description of the case. In partic-
ular, David and Naomi are explicitly described as adopting conicting standards of
what counts as “rich,” and thus it is natural to interpret (if possible) their utterances
as giving voice to these views. Notice that this explanation leaves open room for the
possibility that in a dierent context, it would be more natural to interpret David and
Naomi’s utterances as referring to the content of Beth’s claim. Perhaps this would be
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the case if David and Naomi were described as interested in assessing the status of at-
titudes towards wealth in Beth’s context. More empirical work on this point is needed,
but some initial ndings suggest that just these kinds of changes in the context of as-
sessment do aect judgments about truth value assessments of epistemicmodal claims
(see Beddor & Egan 2017), so there is reason to be optimistic about the strategy con-
sidered here.
One nal issue remains, which is to account for the contrast between “rich” and
“he” in the Assessments experiment. In the context of Beth’s speech, the sentence
she utters “He won $100,000 in the lottery” has as its update value {⟨w , g⟩: Jim won
$100,000 in the lottery at w}. When David says “What Beth said is true,” targeting
the update value of Beth’s utterance, his claim true i Jim won $100,000 in the lottery;
and when Naomi says “What Beth said is false,” targeting the update value of Beth’s
utterance, her claim is true i Jim didn’t win $100,000 in the lottery.36 So, their claims
are incompatible—one of them must be false.us, we predict the contrast observed
between “rich” and “he” in the Assessments experiment.
I conclude that negotiated contextualism has a plausible account of the data both
about “rich”-utterances and “rich”-assessments.
6 Concluding thoughts
We have focused exclusively on one particular gradable adjective, “rich.” However, I
think the lessons generalize beyond “rich,” and promise both a new approach to think-
ing about context dependence and the nature of indexicals and quasi indexicals. For
one, the empirical methods of §1 and §4 promise to generalize quite naturally, and can
be used to explore a wide range of expressions (cf. Khoo 2015, Khoo & Knobe 2016).
Combining that work with the results of this paper yields preliminary evidence that
gradable adjectives, epistemic modals, and moral expressions are quasi indexicals. I
conjecture that many other expressions are quasi indexicals—in particular, I suspect
that many of the expressions that have engendered controversy as to their status as
context sensitive or context invariant are in fact quasi indexicals.ese include quan-
ticational determiners, adverbial quantiers, indicative conditionals, propositional
attitude operators, and tenses (see the debate among semantic minimalists, moderate
contextualists, and radical contextualists canvassed inCappelen&Lepore 2005). More
experimental work is needed to verify this conjecture. Furthermore, more theoretical
36Exactly the same result is secured if we interpret David and Beth’s utterances of “What Beth said”
as referring to the content of Beth’s utterance.
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work is needed to show how one might extend the framework of negotiated contex-
tualism to this wide range of expressions. I leave these matters aside to be explored in
future work.37
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